

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 CIAE-00 NSC-05 DODE-00 INR-07
PM-05 ERDA-05 ERDE-00 /050 W
-----037754 141134Z /12-S
P 131032Z DEC 77
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3992
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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PASS TO DOE

E.O. 11652:YGDS-3
TAGS:PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: REPORT OF DECEMBER 12 PLENARY

CTB MESSAGE NO. 82

1. SUMMARY. MOROKHOV ASKED QUESTIONS ON SECTION OF US WORKING PAPER RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION. HE ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF US VIEWS ON HOW ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS OF DATA EXCHANGE COULD BE WORKED OUT, AND QUESTIONED NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION. WARNKE RESPONDED THAT THERE WAS VALUE IN LETTING THE CCD PLAY A ROLE IN WORKING OUT THE SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE AND THAT AN INTERNATIONAL CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION WOULD BE OF VALUE IN CONSIDERING QUESTIONS RELATED TO MULTILATERAL ASPECTS OF VERIFICATION. CRADOCK RESPONDED BRIEFLY TO MOROKHOV'S QUESTIONS ALONG SIMILAR LINES. END SUMMARY.

2. MOROKHOV OPENED BY THANKING WARNKE AND CRADOCK FOR THEIR ANSWERS TO HIS QUESTIONS ON PNE AT THE PREVIOUS
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PLENARY, SAYING THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD RETURN TO THIS PROBLEM LATER. TURNING TO THE SUBJECT OF HIS STATEMENT, HE EMPHASIZED THAT VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY WAS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTIONS UNDER DISCUSSION. IN ADDITION TO THE OBJECTIVE DIFFICULTY OF THE SUBJECT, HE FELT THAT HISTORICALLY, ARTIFICIAL ROADBLOCKS HAD BEEN SET UP TO THE SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM.

HE WAS GLAD TO NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT COMMON AGREEMENT HAD NOW BEEN REACHED ON THE BASIC COMPONENTS OF A SCHEME WHICH COULD PROVIDE ADEQUATE AND COMPLETE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY. MOROKHOV THEN STRONGLY EMPHASIZED THAT VIABILITY OF THE TREATY WAS UNTHINKABLE WITHOUT MUTUAL CONFIDENCE. WITHOUT SUCH TRUST THERE COULD BE NO TREATY NOR EVEN ANY NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD ITS CONCLUSION. MOROKHOV STRESSED THAT IN CONSIDERING THE US AND UK POSITIONS ON VERIFICATION, SOVIET SIDE WOULD CONSIDER TO WHAT EXTENT THEY REFLECT THE ACTUAL REQUIREMENTS OF VERIFICATION AND TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT VERIFICATION MUST BE BASED ON TRUST.

3. MOROKHOV'S FIRST GROUP OF QUESTIONS DEALT WITH INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA. REFERRING TO THE SUGGESTION THAT GUIDELINES FOR SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE BE WORKED OUT IN AN ANNEX TO THE TREATY AND WORKED OUT IN DETAIL AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE, MOROKHOV THOUGHT THAT ADDITIONAL CLARIFICATION WAS NEEDED TO INDICATE EXACTLY WHAT WAS INTENDED. HE SUGGESTED THAT SUBMISSION OF DRAFT GUIDELINES FOR THE TREATY ANNEX WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE SOVIET SIDE TO CONSIDER THE US PROPOSAL. MOROKHOV THEN ASKED WHETHER THE US SUPPORTED THE UK'S VIEW THAT TRILATERAL CONSIDERATION OF SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE SHOULD BUILD ON THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE CCD AD HOC SEISMIC EXPERTS GROUP. TURNING TO FUTURE WORK OF THE CCD GROUP,

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MOROKHOV ASKED WHETHER THE US AND UK FELT THAT SEISMOLOGISTS FROM THE THREE COUNTRIES SHOULD AGREE IN ADVANCE ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE. HE NOTED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD POSED THIS QUESTION MUCH EARLIER BUT RECEIVED NO DEFINITE REPLY.

4. MOROKHOV'S SECOND GROUP OF QUESTIONS DEALT WITH THE SUGGESTION THAT AN INTERNATIONAL CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (ICC) BE SET UP TO SERVE AS A FORUM FOR CONSIDERATION OF QUESTIONS RELATED TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY. HOW WOULD THIS COMMISSION ACTUALLY DEAL WITH SUCH QUESTIONS IN PRACTICE? HE NOTED SOVIET PREMISE THAT THE BASIS FOR VERIFICATION WAS NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS SUPPLEMENTED BY AN INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA. THE AD HOC CCD GROUP HAD LARGELY AGREED ON THE PRINCIPLES FOR ESTABLISHING A GLOBAL SEISMIC NETWORK AND THE INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA THROUGH THREE INTERNATIONAL DATA COLLECTION CENTERS. IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT THE FUNCTIONING OF INTERNATIONAL CENTERS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO COLLECTION, COLLATION, AND DISSEMINATION OF DATA WITHOUT MAKING JUDGMENTS AS TO THE NATURE OF SEISMIC EVENTS. CONSULTA-

TIONS AMONG THE PARTIES SHOULD BE PROVIDED FOR AND, IN FACT, US WORKING PAPER PROVIDED FOR THIS. IT WAS ALSO UNDERSTOOD THAT IF AMBIGUOUS SEISMIC EVENTS OCCURRED, ON-SITE INSPECTIONS MIGHT BE CARRIED OUT IN SOME CIRCUMSTANCES (MOROKHOV NOTED THEY WOULD BE VOLUNTARY IN THE SOVIET VIEW), BUT THAT NO AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON HOW TO DECIDE TO INITIATE SUCH INSPECTION. THE SOVIET SIDE TOOK NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT THE US WAS PREPARED TO SHOW COOPERATION AND FLEXIBILITY IN THE SEARCH FOR A MUTUALLY ACCEPT-

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P 131032Z DEC 77
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3993
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
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ABLE RESOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM. MOROKHOV ALSO NOTED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER WAYS TO ASSURE THE ACQUISITION OF AUTHENTIC SEISMIC DATA. THIS WAS SIMPLY A TECHNICAL MATTER WHICH THE USSR WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER. FURTHER, MOROKHOV NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD SUGGESTED A PROCEDURE FOR LODGING ANY COMPLAINTS THAT MIGHT ARISE WITH THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. THESE TASKS HE HAD DESCRIBED WERE THE ONES THAT AROSE IN CONNECTION WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS, MOROKHOV ASKED FOR ADDITIONAL CLEARCUT EXPLANATIONS OF WHAT TASKS WERE ENVISIONED FOR THE ICC. PUTTING IT BLUNTLY, HE SAID, WHY IS THERE ANY NEED TO PROVIDE FOR AN ICC?

5. CONTINUING HIS COMMENTS ON THE ICC, MOROKHOV THOUGHT THAT THE PROVISION FOR CONSULTATIONS THROUGH THE ICC ENVISIONED IN PARAGRAPH 4(E)(4) OF THE US WORKING PAPER DUPLICATED THE PROVISION IN 4(B) THAT THE PARTIES CONSULT WITH EACH OTHER, MAKE INQUIRIES, AND FURNISH INFORMATION

IN RESPONSE TO INQUIRIES. PARAGRAPH 4(E)(4) SUGGESTED THAT PARTICIPANTS COULD REQUEST OSI'S TO CLARIFY THE NATURE OF AMBIGUOUS SEISMIC EVENTS THROUGH THE ICC.

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MOROKHOV SAID HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THIS COULD NOT BE HANDLED DIRECTLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES CONCERNED. FINALLY, PARAGRAPH 4(E)(5) SUGGESTED THAT THE ICC SHOULD MAKE PREPARATIONS FOR TREATY REVIEW CONFERENCES. WHY WAS THE US SUGGESTING A CHANGE TO THE EXISTING PRACTICE OF ARRANGING AD HOC PREPARATORY CONFERENCES, WHICH HAD FUNCTIONED SATISFACTORILY FOR THE NPT AND SEABEDS REVIEW CONFERENCES. IN CLOSING MOROKHOV NOTED THAT HIS QUESTIONS ON VERIFICATION HAD NOT BEEN EXHAUSTIVE AND HE WOULD HAVE FURTHER QUESTIONS ON THIS SUBJECT AS WELL AS OTHER ASPECTS OF THE US AND UK PROPOSALS.

6. WARNKE SAID HE WOULD GIVE SOME IMMEDIATE ANSWERS TO MOROKHOV'S QUESTIONS WITH THE OPTION OF SUPPLEMENTING OR EVEN CORRECTING THEM LATER. ON IMPLEMENTING THE INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA, HE NOTED THAT ALL AGREED THAT A SIGNIFICANT FUNCTION OF SUCH EXCHANGE WAS TO GIVE NNWS A MEANINGFUL ROLE IN VERIFICATION. AS A CONSEQUENCE, THERE WAS SOME VALUE IN LETTING THE CCD PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN WORKING ON THE ARRANGEMENT. THE US DID AGREE WITH THE UK THAT WE SHOULD BUILD ON THE WORK OF THE CCD AD HOC GROUP, BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO REACH A SUBSTANTIAL MEASURE OF AGREEMENT ON SUBSTANCE WITHIN THESE TRILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. WARNKE NOTED THAT A USEFUL CHECKLIST OF PROBLEMS TO BE DISCUSSED TRILATERALLY WAS INCLUDED IN THE SOVIET STATEMENT ON INTERNATIONAL DATA EXCHANGE OF 14 OCTOBER. ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE ONE COORDINATED POSITION OF THE THREE SIDES IN FEBRUARY FOR THE NEXT CCD SEISMIC EXPERTS GROUP MEETING, WARNKE NOTED THAT THIS WAS LARGELY A TACTICAL MATTER AND ONE ON WHICH WE SHOULD CONSULT OUR CCD REPRESENTATIVES.

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7. WITH REGARD TO THE ICC ROLE IN CONNECTION WITH INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA, WARNKE SAID IT WOULD BE LIMITED TO IMPLEMENTING THE GUIDELINES AGREED TO IN THE ANNEX TO THE TREATY. THE US HAD NO FIXED POSITION ON MEMBERSHIP IN THE ICC. IT COULD BE EITHER A RELATIVELY SMALL GROUP OR COULD HAVE OPEN-ENDED MEMBERSHIP. HE NOTED

THAT PROBLEMS COULD ARISE IN DETERMINING COMPOSITION OF A SMALL GROUP AND SUGGESTED THAT, GIVEN CONSENSUS PROCEDURES AND LIKELIHOOD THAT A RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBER OF PARTIES WOULD PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY, OPEN-ENDED COMMISSION WOULD PROBABLY BE MANAGEABLE. WE HAD POINTED OUT THAT THE ICC COULD HAVE SUBORDINATE BODIES; SUCH A GROUP MIGHT BE USEFUL, FOR EXAMPLE, IN ELABORATING THE TECHNICAL DETAILS OF SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE. AS TO THE OVERALL JUSTIFICATION FOR HAVING AN ICC, WARNKE NOTED THAT THERE WAS VALUE IN SETTING UP A FORUM TO CONSIDER QUESTIONS RELATED TO MULTILATERAL ASPECTS OF VERIFICATION. WE COULD EXPECT OTHER COUNTRIES TO PRESS FOR SUCH A CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION, AND IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR US TO TAKE THE LEAD AND SHAPE THE ICC TO MEET OUR INTERESTS. FOR EXAMPLE, WE WOULD WANT TO ENSURE THAT THE ICC WOULD NOT BE EMPOWERED TO MAKE ANY JUDGMENTS ON TREATY COMPLIANCE, AND THAT IT WOULD OPERATE BY CONSENSUS.

8. ON THE POSSIBLE DUPLICATION OF PROVISIONS FOR CONSULTATIONS, WE HAD MADE CLEAR THAT CONSULTATIONS ARE PERMITTED WITHIN THE ICC, BUT NOT REQUIRED. WE WOULD HOPE THAT USING THE ICC WOULD ENCOURAGE MODERATION AND RESPONSIBILITY. THERE WOULD BE FEWER INSTANCES OF FRIVOLOUS QUESTIONS BEING RAISED. THE ROLE OF THE ICC WOULD BE LIMITED. FOR INSTANCE, WARNKE DID NOT BELIEVE THE ICC WOULD BE EMPOWERED TO MAKE DECISIONS AS TO WHETHER OSI'S SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT, BUT RATHER SERVE AS A FORUM FOR MAKING REQUESTS AND

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P 131032Z DEC 77
FM USMISSION GENEVA
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FURNISHING INFORMATION ON SUCH REQUESTS. THE ICC WOULD

FUNCTION ESSENTIALLY AS A SAFETY VALVE TO PROVIDE A MECHANISM FOR OTHER COUNTRIES TO SATISFY THEIR CONCERNS. IN REGARD TO USING THE ICC TO PREPARE FOR REVIEW CONFERENCES, WARNKE SAW THIS AS A METHOD TO AVOID TIME CONSUMING DISCUSSIONS REGARDING PROCEDURAL AND OTHER MATTERS THAT HAD ARISEN IN THE PAST WHEN REVIEW CONFERENCES WERE PREPARED BY AD HOC GROUPS.

9. FINALLY, WARNKE RESPONDED TO MOROKHOV'S REFERENCE TO SOVIET VIEWS ON OSI'S AND INTERNAL SEISMIC STATIONS. THE TRADITIONAL US POSITION, WHICH WE CONTINUE TO HOLD, IS THAT SOME NUMBER OF MANDATORY ON-SITE INSPECTIONS WOULD BE BENEFICIAL TO ESTABLISHING THE VIABILITY OF THE TREATY. THE SOVIET IDEA OF VOLUNTARINESS COULD BE INTERPRETED AS MAKING ANY OSI PROVISIONS ESSENTIALLY ILLUSORY. WE WERE PREPARED TO BE COOPERATIVE AND FLEXIBLE IN BRINGING OUR WIDELY SEPARATE POSITIONS TOGETHER, AND HOPED THE SOVIETS WOULD BE ALSO. REFERRING TO THE SOVIET READINESS TO CONSIDER WAYS TO ASSURE THE AUTHENTICATION OF DATA FROM INTERNAL STATIONS, WARNKE NOTED THAT THE US WOULD SHORTLY HAVE MORE SPECIFIC IDEAS TO PUT FORWARD IN THIS REGARD.

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10. CRADOCK COMMENTED BRIEFLY ON MOROKHOV'S QUESTIONS ON SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE AND THE ICC. AGREEING WITH WARNKE, HE SAID GUIDELINES FOR SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE SHOULD BE SET FORTH IN AN ANNEX TO THE TREATY AND THAT, AS FAR AS IT WAS TACTICALLY ADVANTAGEOUS, THE THREE SIDES SHOULD COORDINATE THEIR POSITIONS FOR THE CCD AD HOC SEISMIC EXPERTS GROUP. HE SAID THE UK WAS STUDYING US SUGGESTIONS ON THE ICC, BUT AGREED PRELIMINARILY THAT IT WOULD PLAY A USEFUL ROLE IN VERIFICATION. THE UK WAS INTERESTED IN ITS PARTNERS' VIEWS ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE ICC SHOULD HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF PREPARING FOR REVIEW CONFERENCES. HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING FOLLOWING PLENARY REPORTED SEPTTEL.

11. NEXT PLENARY SET FOR 10:30 AM, 14 DECEMBER. INFORMAL MEETINGS OF POLITICAL/LEGAL AND TECHNICAL GROUPS SCHEDULED FOR 13 DECEMBER. WARNKE

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Message Attributes

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Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
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Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 261627
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Status: NATIVE
Subject: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: REPORT OF DECEMBER 12 PLENARY CTB MESSAGE NO. 82
TAGS: PARM, US, UK, UR
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbcr://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/44b5c305-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009